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CAPERTON v. MASSEY:
THE DUE PROCESS IMPLICATIONS
OF CONTRIBUTIONS TO JUDICIAL
CAMPAIGNS
WADE KOLB, III*

I. INTRODUCTION
The saga of Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co. can be traced back
to 1998 when the petitioner Caperton filed suit against Massey and
several affiliates in the circuit court of Boone County, West Virginia.1
At the heart of Caperton’s complaint was a contract dispute, and
following a lengthy trial in 2002, a Boone County jury returned a
verdict of just over $50 million for the petitioners.2 During the ensuing
seven years, Caperton v. Massey—in all its various permutations—has
generated an enormous amount of national attention, both inspiring a
best-selling novel3 and prompting two editorials in the New York
4
Times that called for the Supreme Court to review the case.
Proponents of judicial election reform have seized upon Caperton as
emblematic of all that is wrong with the way judges are selected in
many parts of the United States.5 Indeed, the petitioners allege that
the case motivated Massey’s CEO to work to defeat a sitting justice of
the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals and elect his

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 33350, at 10 (W. Va. April 3, 2008), available at
http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/docs/spring08/33350R.pdf.
2. Id. at 11.
3. Paul J. Nyden, Novel Linked to State Election, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.wvgazette.com/News/200801290715; see also JOHN GRISHAM, THE
APPEAL (Doubleday 2008).
4. Editorial, Tainted Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2008, at A36; Editorial, Too Generous,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2008, at WK8.
5. See, e.g., Brief of Justice at Stake, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 2–
3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 45976.
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replacement.6 In a final twist, Caperton may yet lead to an important
ruling from the United States Supreme Court on the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The original contract
dispute has thus come a long way.
Following the initial $50 million verdict, Massey filed numerous
post-trial motions before finally seeking review of the trial court’s
decision in the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in October
7
2006. The composition of the Supreme Court of Appeals—West
Virginia’s only appellate court—changed significantly in 2004 when a
political newcomer, Brent Benjamin, defeated the incumbent Justice
Warren McGraw to gain one of the court’s five seats.8 The chairman
and CEO of Massey, Don L. Blankenship, played a major role in
Benjamin’s 2004 campaign, spending some $3 million of his own
money in an independent effort to defeat Justice McGraw.9 When
Caperton v. Massey came before the Court of Appeals, Caperton
repeatedly moved for Justice Benjamin to recuse himself given the
political support Benjamin had received from Mr. Blankenship.10
Benjamin refused to do so and twice cast the deciding vote in favor of
11
overturning the original jury verdict. In November 2008, the
Supreme Court granted Massey’s petition for a writ of certiorari to
decide the question of whether due process requires a judge to recuse
himself when he has been the beneficiary of a litigant’s significant
campaign contributions.12
II. FACTS
Though largely beyond the scope of this commentary, the
underlying conflict between the parties to this dispute began in the
late 1990s. As one of the nation’s largest coal companies, Massey was
seeking to expand its market share by acquiring the business of LTV
Steel.13 LTV, however, had repeatedly refused Massey’s direct
overtures, preferring to purchase coal supplied by the Harman Mine

6. Brief for Petitioners at 5–8, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29,
2008), 2008 WL 5433361.
7. Id. at 6.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 6–8.
10. Id. at 9–14.
11. Id.
12. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008) (mem.).
13. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22
(U.S. July 2, 2008), 2008 WL 2676568.
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in Buchanan County, Virginia.14 The petitioner, Caperton, owned the
Harman Mine and sold all of its coal to the Wellmore Corporation,
which acted as an intermediary between the Harman Mine and LTV
15
steel. To circumvent this arrangement, Massey purchased the parent
company of Wellmore, planning to substitute the Massey coal for that
of the Harman Mine.16 But after Massey’s acquisition of Wellmore,
LTV still refused to purchase the Massey coal and subsequently broke
17
off its business relationship with Wellmore. At the direction of
Massey, Wellmore then terminated its contract to buy coal from the
Harman Mine, invoking the force majeure clause in its contract with
Caperton.18 The termination occurred late in the year, effectively
preventing Caperton from securing another purchaser.19 At this same
time Massey entered into negotiations to purchase the Harman
Mine.20 Massey later withdrew from these negotiations, but only after
it had obtained confidential information that Massey then used to
21
strengthen its position against Caperton.
The combined result of Massey’s actions drove Caperton into
bankruptcy, and in 1998 Caperton sued Massey in West Virginia for
fraudulent misrepresentation, tortious interference with existing
22
contractual relations, and fraudulent concealment. Caperton filed
this action against Massey in Boone County, West Virginia, after first
23
filing suit against Wellmore in Buchanan County, Virginia. As a
result, Massey sought to dismiss the West Virginia suit, alleging that a
forum selection clause required that any action be brought in Virginia
and that Caperton’s claims were precluded on the basis of res
judicata.24 The West Virginia trial court rejected both arguments, and a
jury in Boone County delivered a verdict of $50 million for Caperton
25
in late 2002. Massey filed a variety of post-trial motions but did not

14. Id. at 3–4.
15. Id. at 4.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 4–5.
22. Id. at 5.
23. Brief for Respondents at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 28,
2009), 2009 WL 216165.
24. Id. at 6–7.
25. Id. at 7.
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actually appeal the decision to the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals until 2006.26
In the intervening four years, Massey’s CEO, Don L. Blankenship,
became heavily involved in an election for one of the seats on that
27
court. In 2004, the incumbent, Justice Warren McGraw, sought reelection to a twelve year term on the Supreme Court of Appeals but
faced a challenge from a “political newcomer,” Charleston lawyer
Brent Benjamin.28 Following a particularly acrimonious campaign,
Benjamin surprised many and narrowly defeated McGraw.29 During
the campaign Mr. Blankenship spent over $3 million of his personal
30
fortune to help defeat Justice McGraw. Only $1,000 went to
Benjamin’s campaign directly; most of the rest—nearly $2.5 million—
31
went to fund a “527 organization,” And For The Sake Of The Kids
(“ASK”), which Blankenship helped found.32 The express purpose of
ASK was to defeat Justice McGraw, and the organization worked
towards that goal mainly by producing and publishing negative
advertisements that targeted McGraw and his judicial record.33
Beyond his support for ASK, Blankenship spent another $500,000 to
purchase anti-McGraw advertisements in newspapers and on
television.34 Finally, Blankenship conducted an extensive letter-writing
campaign aimed at West Virginia physicians. In these letters,
Blankenship appealed for donations to Benjamin’s campaign and
claimed that defeating Justice McGraw would lead to lower medical
malpractice premiums.35
Two years after Benjamin’s 2004 election, Massey finally
petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals to review its
case.36 At that time both sides sought to have judges recuse

26. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 6.
27. Id.
28. Carol Morello, W. Va. Supreme Court Justice Defeated in Rancorous Contest, WASH.
POST, Nov. 4, 2004, at A15.
29. Id.
30. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 6–7.
31. Named after the section of the United States tax code that created them, “527
Organizations” are tax-exempt organizations formed to influence political campaigns. Neither
state nor federal election commissions regulate their contributions or activities. See generally 26
U.S.C.A § 527 (West 2007).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 7.
35. Id. at 7–8.
36. Id. at 9–10.
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themselves.37 Predictably, Caperton requested the recusal of the new
justice, Brent Benjamin, on grounds that Mr. Blankenship’s
extraordinary support for Benjamin’s campaign created an
38
unconstitutional appearance of bias. For its part, Massey sought the
recusal of Justice Larry Starcher, who had publically criticized
Blankenship for his involvement in Justice Benjamin’s 2004 election.39
Per the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, both motions
were directed at the judges themselves, and neither motion was
subject to review by the entire court.40 Both judges declined to recuse
themselves, and in November of 2007, the court issued a 3-2 decision
that overturned the trial court’s verdict and “created nearly a dozen
new points of West Virginia law.”41 Justice Benjamin voted with the
majority, and both Justices Starcher and Albright filed “vigorous
dissents.”42
43
Following its defeat, Caperton filed a petition for a rehearing. A
second scandal broke shortly thereafter: photographs surfaced
showing Mr. Blankenship and acting Chief Justice Maynard dining
together in the French Riviera.44 The photographs had been taken
while the Massey case was on appeal, and Maynard had been one of
the three votes in the majority to overturn the original trial court
decision. 45 In the wake of the ensuing scandal, Maynard claimed that
his “longstanding friendship” with Blankenship had been well-known
before the appeal came up and that it had not affected his decision;
nevertheless, he decided to recuse himself from further participation
46
in the case. A circuit judge appointed by Justice Benjamin replaced
Maynard, and the new court then voted to accept Caperton’s petition
for rehearing.47 Before the rehearing, however, Justice Starcher also
decided to recuse himself, accepting Massey’s argument that his
37. Id. at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also W. VA. R. APP. P. 29.
41. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 10; see also Joint Appendix, Volume II, at 340a–
411a, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Dec. 29, 2008), 2008 WL 5422892.
42. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11; see also Joint Appendix, Volume II, supra
note 41, at 420a–431a.
43. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 11.
44. Adam Liptak, West Virginia Judge Steps Out of Case Involving a Travel Companion,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/19/us/19judge.html.
45. Id.
46. Ian Urbina, West Virginia’s Top Judge Loses His Re-election Bid, N.Y. TIMES, May 15,
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/15/us/15judge.html.
47. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 12.
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criticisms of Blankenship’s political involvement had created a public
perception of bias.48 Starcher also urged Justice Benjamin to recuse
himself, but Benjamin held fast, serving as acting Chief Justice for the
rehearing and appointing two circuit judges to replace Maynard and
Starcher.49 In April of 2008, this reconstituted court again voted 3-2 to
overturn the original trial court verdict, and once again Justice
50
Benjamin voted with the majority. Several months later, Justice
Benjamin issued a concurring opinion in which he explained, inter
alia, his decision not to recuse himself.51
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The key question of Caperton v. Massey—whether the Due
Process Clause is violated when a judge fails to recuse himself from a
case that involves a significant contributor to the judge’s political
campaign—is one of first impression for the Supreme Court.
Traditionally, the states have been left to determine for themselves
the rules governing recusal in their courts.52 Of necessity, the question
Caperton presents can arise only in the context of the state court
system. After all, federal judges are nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate; they have lifetime appointments and are not
53
subject to popular elections. In contrast, the states employ a wide
variety of methods for selecting judges, including popular election,
merit selection, appointment by the governor, and election by the
state legislature.54 Despite this variety, “all but a handful of States hold
popular elections to choose at least some judges to some benches at
some stage of a judge’s career.”55 Just as the methods for selecting
judges vary from state to state, so too the rules governing the recusal
of state judges vary, and the Supreme Court has made it clear that
“most matters relating to judicial disqualification [do] not rise to a

48. Id. at 13.
49. Id. at 13–14.
50. Id. at 14.
51. Joint Appendix, supra note 41, at 654a–98a.
52. Brief for Respondents in Opposition to a Writ of Certiorari at 24–26, Caperton v. A.T.
Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2008), 2008 WL 4126332.
53. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2, cl. 2, and art. 3, § 1.
54. For a survey of the various means used by the states to select judges, see generally The
American
Judicature
Society,
Methods
of
Judicial
Selection,
available
at
http://www.judicialselection.us/.
55. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party
at 5, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009), 2009 WL 45973.
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constitutional level.”56 The Court has further held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause establishes a “constitutional floor,
not a uniform standard”;57 the states are therefore free to enact
58
stricter rules regarding recusal if they see fit.
The notion of judicial recusal stems from the ancient common law
maxim of aliquis non debet esse judex in propria causa: “no man shall
59
be a judge in his own case.” In Anglo-American jurisprudence this
was traditionally taken to mean that a judge had to recuse himself
from any case in which he had a financial interest.60 This principle
clearly underlies most of the early recusal cases heard by the Supreme
Court. In Tumey v. Ohio, for example, the Court found a violation of
due process when a town mayor served as the judge of a criminal
proceeding but was paid for overseeing the trial only if the defendant
was convicted.61 The Tumey court famously stated that “every
procedure which would offer a possible temptation to the average
man as a judge to forget the burden of proof required to convict the
defendant, or which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear,
and true between the state and the accused denies the latter due
process of law.”62
The financial stake of a judge also proved dispositive in Aetna Life
Insurance v. Lavoie, which involved a bad faith refusal-to-pay claim
63
against an insurance company. The case came before the Alabama
Supreme Court, and the justice who authored that court’s opinion and
cast the deciding vote was also a plaintiff in a similar case pending
before another state court.64 In vacating and remanding the Alabama
court’s decision, the Supreme Court held that a litigant need not
prove a judge’s actual bias to show that a violation of due process has
occurred.65 Rather, a judge who might be capable of impartiality can
nevertheless be barred from hearing a case because “‘justice must
satisfy the appearance of justice.’”66

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 702 (1948).
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899, 904 (1997).
Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 2–3.
John Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J. 605, 609–10 & n.14 (1947).
Id. at 610–12.
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
Id. at 532.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
Id. at 813–14.
Id. at 825
Id. (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (citation omitted)).
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The financial interest of a judge was considerably less direct in
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, yet the Supreme Court still found a
due process violation.67 In Ward, a town mayor both oversaw the
town’s budget and presided over its traffic court, which provided a
substantial portion of the town’s income through the imposition of
various traffic fines.68 The Court found this setup problematic, noting
that its holding in Tumey concerning the “possible temptation to the
average man . . . not to hold the balance nice clear and true” was not
confined only to those situations where the mayor shared in the fines
69
his court imposed. A system where the judge could be torn between
two “practically and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and
the other judicial,” also violated a defendant’s due process rights.70
The Supreme Court has also held that recusal was constitutionally
required in at least two cases that did not involve any pecuniary
interest on the part of a judge. In Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, the Court
held that a judge could not preside over a criminal defendant’s
contempt proceedings if the same judge had been subjected to the
verbal abuse that prompted the proceedings.71 Similarly, the Court
found in Taylor v. Hayes that a judge could not preside over a lawyer’s
contempt proceeding when the same judge had been involved in a
lengthy dispute with the lawyer during the trial.72 “[T]he inquiry,” the
Court held, “must be not only whether there was actual bias on
respondent’s part, but also whether there was ‘such a likelihood of
bias or an appearance of bias that the judge was unable to hold the
balance between vindicating the interests of the court and the
interests of the accused.’”73
IV. ARGUMENTS
A. Petitioners and Supporting Amici Curiae
Caperton’s Petition for a Writ of Certiorari relied heavily on the
cases described above, noting that “the appearance of impropriety
created by the $3 million that Mr. Blankenship spent on Justice

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971).
Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 501 (1974).
Id. (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 588 (1964)).
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Benjamin’s campaign is at least as strong as the appearance of
impropriety in Murchison, Mayberry, and Lavoie.”74 Curiously though,
Caperton’s merits brief largely abandoned the argument that an
75
“appearance of bias” has constitutional implications for due process.
Instead, Caperton argued that Tumey, Murchison, and their progeny
imply that due process requires a judge’s recusal “where an objective
76
inquiry establishes a probability of bias on a judge’s part.” For
example, a judge would not have to recuse himself from a case
involving a supporter whose “contribution represents only a small
fraction of the overall financial support for the judge’s campaign.” If
the contribution is small, Caperton suggested, “no reasonable
observer would conclude that such modest campaign support creates
a probability that the judge is biased in favor of the supporter.”77 In
contrast, an objective observer would conclude from the facts
surrounding Caperton v. Massey and the Benjamin campaign that
Justice Benjamin was probably biased.78
Caperton provided five reasons to support this contention,
implicitly suggesting that the Court could use these reasons to
establish a test to determine when campaign contributions implicate
79
the Due Process Clause. Caperton’s first reason was based on the
“sheer volume” of Mr. Blankenship’s support: beyond West Virginia’s
80
limit of $1,000 in direct support, Blankenship’s personal contribution
of $3 million to the overall campaign effort was $1 million more than
the total amount spent by the campaign committees of McGraw and
Benjamin combined.81 This fact was closely tied to the second reason
that an objective observer would find a reasonable probability of
bias—the amount of Blankenship’s support as a percentage of the
total amount spent on Benjamin’s campaign. Here, Blankenship’s
support was 60% of the total amount.82
Caperton’s final three reasons why an objective inquiry could
have established a probability that Benjamin was biased were—unlike

74. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 13, at 19–20.
75. This change of strategy did not go unnoticed by Massey: see Brief for the Respondents,
supra note 23, at 1.
76. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 6, at 15.
77. Id. at 26.
78. Id. at 27.
79. Id.
80. W. VA. CODE § 3-8-12(f)(2005).
81. Id. at 28.
82. Id.
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the first two—not directly financial. The third was that Blankenship
“actively campaigned” for Benjamin by writing letters and soliciting
donations; he therefore deserved at least some credit for raising a
substantial portion of the money that went directly to Benjamin’s
campaign committee.83 Fourth, Caperton noted the suspicious timing
of Blankenship’s involvement, which looked as though it “was
84
intended to influence the outcome of th[e] . . . appeal.” Fifth and
finally, Caperton pointed to the procedural process governing recusal
in West Virginia. There, when a judge decides not to recuse himself, his
decision is not subject to review by the other members of the court. In
states where such a decision is reviewed, “the likelihood of judicial
bias may be diminished because the allegations of bias have been
examined . . . by the judge’s colleagues.”85
The five factors set forth in Caperton’s brief on the merits—the
contribution volume, the volume as a percentage of the total amount
spent, the litigant’s active support for a candidate, the timing of the
contribution, and the procedure for reviewing recusal decisions—
were essentially endorsed and amplified in several amicus briefs. The
American Bar Association (ABA), for example, conceded the
impossibility of establishing any fixed amount of contribution beyond
86
which a judge would have to recuse himself. Election costs vary from
state to state, and what would be a large amount in one state may not
be so in others. The ABA nevertheless concluded that “a contribution
that is unusually large in absolute or relative terms, or that results in
an appearance of dependence on the contributor, should weigh
heavily in favor of recusal.”87 The ABA also suggested that the Court
consider the timing of the contribution and the “relationship between
88
the contributor and the case.”
Like the ABA, the Conference of Chief Justices proposed that
Caperton is an opportunity for the Court “to clarify the analysis to be
considered in deciding whether a recusal is constitutionally required
89
because of campaign support.” Among the criteria the Conference
believed to be important were (1) the size of the expenditure
83. Id. at 29.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 29–30.
86. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at
19, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45978.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 19–20.
89. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 24.
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considered relative to the size of the electorate; (2) whether the
support is direct or—as in Caperton—mainly indirect; (3) the timing
of the support; (4) the actual and perceived effectiveness of the
support; (5) the nature of the supporter’s prior political activities; (6)
the nature of any prior relationship between the contributor and the
judge; and (7) the relationship between the supporter and the actual
litigant.90
Several pro-business research centers and numerous major
corporations also wrote amicus briefs in support of Caperton. In
essence, these parties pleaded with the Court to save American
businesses from their own worst instincts. One amicus brief argued
that if the Supreme Court does not act to require judges who have
received substantial contributions to recuse themselves, then a
business, its shareholders, and its board of directors might well be
forced “to support candidates whose judicial philosophies represent
91
the company’s best interests in pending or anticipated litigation.”
This brief likened the situation to a classic “prisoner’s dilemma”:
For ethical and financial reasons, most corporations would prefer
to avoid spending money on an election that involves candidates
for a seat on a court where it has a matter pending. . . . In today’s
election environment, however, a corporation must consider the
likelihood that its opponent in high-stakes litigation may actively
support one or more of the judges that will hear the case.
Increasingly, corporations feel compelled to support their own
candidates to guard against an adverse judgment that damages the
company and its shareholders. Mandatory recusal is necessary to
stanch this campaign spending arms race and maintain the
92
integrity of the judicial system.

Wal-Mart, Pepsico, Lockheed-Martin, and other prominent
American businesses expressed somewhat related concerns in their
own amicus brief supporting Caperton. These corporations argued
that the public’s confidence in a fair and independent judiciary “is of
particular value to those engaged in commerce, who rely on
evenhanded justice to make informed financial and investment

90. Id. at 25–29.
91. Brief of the Center for Political Accountability and the Carol and Lawrence Zicklin
Center for Business Ethics Research as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 10–11,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45977.
92. Id. at 4.
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decisions.”93 If justice can be bought through political contributions,
the legal framework upon which businesses “assess risks and calibrate
benefits” becomes far less predictable and less reliable.94
B. Respondents and Supporting Amici Curiae
In a lengthy concurring opinion filed some three months after the
second Massey decision came down, Justice Benjamin addressed his
decision not to recuse himself.95 Many of the arguments he touched on
in his concurrence were picked up and amplified by Massey in its
brief for the Supreme Court. Benjamin initially addressed and
rejected the argument that a judge should recuse himself based on an
appearance of impropriety. The Supreme Court, Benjamin contended,
has never endorsed appearance-driven recusal; in fact, many appellate
circuits have “rejected the contention that appearance driven
conflicts, without more, raise due process implications.”96 Although
Benjamin dismissed the argument that appearances demanded his
recusal, his version of the facts mitigated the “appearance” of bias. For
one, Benjamin pointed out that Blankenship’s money went to a 527
organization and not directly to his campaign. “I had no role and no
control in anything that ASK did during the campaign,” Benjamin
maintained, “nor did I have any role in causing Mr. Blankenship or
anyone else to contribute to ASK or otherwise do or not do anything
in the 2004 Supreme Court election.”97 Benjamin also observed that
on other occasions he had voted against Massey’s interests, including
on cases that had involved a higher dollar amount than the case sub
judice.98
Massey’s merits brief reiterated these same arguments, rejecting
the idea of appearance-driven recusal and suggesting instead that
Tumey, Lavoie, and the Court’s other Due Process Clause decisions
are merely applications of the common law maxim that “‘a judge with

93. Brief of Amici Curiae The Committee for Economic Development et al. in Support of
Petitioners at 6, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL
45974.
94. Id. at 8–9.
95. Joint Appendix, supra note 41, at 654a–98a.
96. Id. at 665a (citing Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 262 (3d Cir. 2004); Callahan v.
Campbell, 427 F.3d 897, 928–29 (11th Cir. 2005); Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 31
F.3d 1363, 1371–82 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc)).
97. Id. at 685a.
98. Id. at 674a–75a, n.29.
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a financial interest in the outcome of the case may not sit.’”99 Massey
also suggested that the Court’s holdings in Mayberry and Taylor,
though admittedly not involving a judge’s pecuniary interest, were
still “contempt-specific” and did not “rest on any generalized
acceptance of a constitutional ‘probability of bias’ standard.”100
Moreover, were the Court to accept such a standard now, Massey
contended, its adoption would suggest that many members of the
Supreme Court itself had acted unconstitutionally over the past two
hundred years. Most notably, Chief Justice Marshall was both the
author of the Court’s decision in Marbury v. Madison and the cause of
the litigation!101 In contrast to his participation in Marbury, Marshall
recused himself from adjudicating Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, because
102
in Martin, Marshall had a pecuniary interest. Thus, Massey
summarized, “there is no basis in history, precedent, or the practice of
this Court for the notion that a judge’s ‘bias’ in general—let alone a
mere ‘probability of bias’—mandates disqualification under the Due
Process Clause.”103
Massey and supporting amici also raised the specter of an
onslaught of due process challenges to state court decisions if the
104
Court were to endorse a “probability of bias” standard. Massey’s
brief criticized the “‘vague and malleable’” guidelines offered by
Caperton and supporting amici, and suggested that the impossibility
of drawing a constitutional line would “open the gates for a flood of
litigation.”105 Seven states echoed these concerns in an amicus brief,
predicting that a reversal “will give birth to a new breed of litigation
106
pleading: the ‘Caperton motion.’” Every state-court recusal dispute
would be at risk of becoming a federal case in which a “multifactor
morass” would need to be applied to determine whether a judge was
required to recuse himself.107 “While that sort of hypercontextualism
may well be appropriate to legislative policymaking on the state

99. Brief for Respondents, supra note 23, at 19 (quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of
Corrections, 31 F.3d 1363, 1391 (7th Cir. 1994) (Easterbrook, J., concurring)).
100. Id. at 23.
101. Id. at 25–26; see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. Id. at 26–27; see also Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
103. Id. at 15.
104. Id. at 44–46.
105. Id. at 44 (quoting Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1542 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring)).
106. Brief of the States of Alabama, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 28,
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Feb. 4, 2009) 2009 WL 298466.
107. Id. at 5.
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level,” the brief concluded, “it is not the stuff of which constitutional
doctrines should be made.”108
V. PROBABLE DISPOSITION
Given the widespread support for Caperton and the calls for
action by various amici across the political spectrum, the Supreme
Court may clarify that due process requires a judge who has received
substantial campaign support to recuse himself from a supporter’s
case. Massey’s arguments will have little appeal to the Court’s liberal
justices. And even the Court’s conservative justices may decide that
the weight of the argument lies with Caperton and the independent
groups advocating on Caperton’s behalf. Indeed, this is not a case that
breaks down easily along ideological lines; both major corporations
and the liberal-leaning Brennan Center at New York University have
written amicus briefs supporting Caperton, and Ted Olson, the
solicitor general during President George W. Bush’s first
109
administration, is arguing Caperton’s case.
Certainly the neo-federalists on the Court will be inclined to
sympathize with at least some of the arguments advanced in Massey’s
brief. Recusal in state courts is generally a matter of state concern,
and some conservative justices will be wary of federalizing this
domain, especially with fuzzy standards that leave room for creative
lawyering.110 If, however, the Court can agree on explicit standards
that both give guidance to the states as they make their own reforms
and prevent an onslaught of potential “Caperton challenges” to state
court decisions, some of the more conservative justices might join in a
vote for the petitioners.

108. Id.
109. See Brief of Amici Curiae The Committee for Economic Development et al. in Support
of Petitioners, supra note 93; Brief of Amici Curiae the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU
School of Law, et al. in Support of Petitioners, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22
(U.S. Jan. 5, 2009) 2009 WL 45972; see also Paul J. Nyden, Mining Appeal Moving Along,
CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 16, 2008, available at http://www.wvgazette.com/
News/200805150741 (reporting on Olson’s taking the case).
110. See generally David Franklin, The Roberts Court, the 2008 Election, and the Future of
the Judiciary, 6 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 513, 515 (2008) (“We are obviously still very early in
the career of Chief Justice John Roberts, . . . but it’s already clear that one way in which Roberts
is similar to Justices Scalia and Thomas is that he has a strong preference for what he views as
clear, bright-line, judicially imposed rules as opposed to what he views as broad, fuzzy,
manipulable, open-ended standards.”); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (arguing generally for a rule-based approach).

DO NOT DELETE

2009]

3/17/2009 8:53:46 AM

CAPERTON V. MASSEY

329

In its amicus brief the Conference of Chief Justices directly
addressed the fear that a ruling for Caperton would open the
floodgates to thousands of challenges based on due process grounds.
The Conference concluded, however, that this fear was “unfounded”
since federal review of a state judge’s failure to recuse himself “would
be limited to cases of extraordinary [campaign] support.”111 Given the
bi-partisan and neutral position of the Conference, its opinion may
help to sway some conservatives on the Court who have misgivings
about federalizing another due process standard.
Caperton’s change between its petition for certiorari and merits
brief from an “appearance argument” to a “probability of bias”
argument may also be an attempt to win over the Court’s most
conservative members. Indeed, Justice Scalia was very skeptical when
the Sierra Club asked him to recuse himself from Cheney v. U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia because of an appearance
of bias.112 “The decision whether a judge’s impartiality can ‘reasonably
be questioned,’” Justice Scalia declared, “is to be made in light of the
facts as they existed, and not as they were surmised or reported.”113
Even in Cheney, though, Justice Scalia conceded that the Sierra Club’s
argument that he should resolve all doubts in favor of recusal “might
be sound advice” were he sitting on an appellate court where the case
114
“would be taken by another judge, and . . . proceed normally.”
Because the case was before the Supreme Court, however, Cheney
would have been forced to proceed with only eight judges, creating
the possibility of a tie vote.115 Obviously the procedures of the West
Virginia Supreme Court are closer to those of a federal appellate
court: had Justice Benjamin recused himself, another circuit judge
would have been appointed to take his place.
Finally, Massey’s suggestion that a “probability of bias” standard
has no support in either the common law or an original understanding
of the Due Process Clause is clearly an appeal meant to resonate with
the Court’s conservative justices. Nevertheless, this argument ignores
the fact that judicial elections, especially those that involve significant
expense and campaign contributions, are an entirely modern

111. Brief of the Conference of Chief Justices, supra note 55, at 23.
112. Cheney v. United States District Court for the District of Columbia, et al., 541 U.S. 913
(2004) (Scalia, J., in chambers).
113. Id. at 913 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. United States, 530 U.S. 1301, 1302 (2000)).
114. Id. at 915.
115. Id.
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phenomenon.116 As twenty-seven former justices and chief justices of
state supreme courts said in their amicus brief, “Novel practices call
for new paradigms of due process analysis; otherwise, cleverly
designed schemes and convoluted machinations would eviscerate the
ancient protections of due process.”117 In deciding to hear Caperton
this term, the Court may well be on the verge of announcing one of
these “new paradigms” very soon.

116. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners at
10, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., No. 08-22 (U.S. Jan. 2, 2009) 2009 WL 45979.
117. Id.

